Critical Neuroscience – loud or quiet?

Is it appropriate to critique scientists in a provocative manner? On the third Critical Neuroscience workshop in Marburg we discussed the public presentation and scope of new findings in neuroscience.

Vivid depictions of the new brain sciences in the media and popular writing, often in the form of a futuristic discourse of promise and progress, increasingly lead to the incorporation of neuroscientific language into laypeople’s self-understanding. […] This happens despite the fact that many of the experimental results and their theoretical articulations are unstable and provisional at the current stage of development in the field. (critical-neuroscience.org)

[Auch in deutscher Sprache verfügbar; German version available.]

Most of us know the presentation of intriguing findings of neuroscience. Particularly within the domain of human feeling, deliberation and decisions we recurrently face strong claims: for example, when scientists claim they could determine the results of decisions a long time before becoming conscious or could predict whether someone is going to keep or break a promise way before the person herself decides. Psychologist and professor of law Stephen Morse, reflecting on the translation of some neuroscientific claims into the legal domain, has ample reason to speak of a “Brain Overclaim Syndrome”.

How should we cope with such exaggerated claims? How should we react to the fact that most media reward overstatement and neglect humble presentations? In this respect, 2009 was a remarkable year, in which the rebellious Ph.D. student Ed Vul from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology launched his attack against social neuroscience. Of course, I refer to “Voodoo Correlations” about which I earlier reported in my German blog MENSCHEN-BILDER.

Daniel Margulies from the Max Planck Institute for Cognitive and Neuroscience reflected this provocative critique on the workshop in Marburg. To refresh our memory: The paper of Vul and colleagues has been accepted for publication in the scientific journal Perspectives on Psychological Science at the end of 2008. According to Margulies, the senior author, Harold Pashler from the University of California at San Diego – where Ed Vul will start working this July, by the way – distributed the paper to a couple of colleagues. This is not uncommon. Yet, two facts would have started a chain reaction: First the sensational tone, speaking of “voodoo” and “impossibly high correlations” in social neuroscience. Second the publication of a detailed list of the studies criticized including the authors' full names.

The critique was eventually distributed in the blogosphere, according to Margulies, before Newsweek published a corresponding report as the first scientific medium. From that moment on, time was crucial since the explicitly criticized scientists naturally had to respond to the accusations in order to defend their research. Besides the discussion of the actual scientific issue, another topic was whether the tone and the medium of the original critique were appropriate. Some of the addressed scientists also complained that they learned about these issues from science journalists, not the scientific community.

As one of the hallmarks of the scientist is critical, rational skepticism, the lack of opportunities to develop the ability to reason and argue scientifically would appear to be a significant weakness in contemporary educational practice. In short, knowing what is wrong matters as much as knowing what is right. (Jonathan Osborne [2010]. Science 328, p. 463)

Compared to Vul and colleagues' paper, a – regarding the methodological content – similar publication of Nikolaus Kriegeskorte and colleagues hardly received any public attention – although it was published in the renowned journal Nature Neuroscience. Its tone was more modest, the argument more difficult to understand and these authors also refrained from publishing the list of those studies whose methods had been applied in a problematic manner.

This comparison raises the issue of how a project of “critical” neuroscience should proceed – should it endorse the selection criteria of the media to spread its message, carrying the risk that academic colleagues might call this “unscientific” or might be upset? Wouldn't it be just fair to use the same strategies frequently applied by scientists themselves to benefit from the popularization of their research? Or would it be more appropriate to speak with the quiet voice of reason and to trust that in the long term the correct message will prevail?

[The success of the materialistic world view] is not based on the clarity and defensibility of its arguments, but rather on the keenness of its presentation and in the zeitgeist which rather popularizes doctrines of this kind as they are promising to jeopardize the established order. (Josef Hyrtl, 1864/1897, p. 36f.; my translation)

According to this diagnosis by anatomist Josef Hyrtl the domain of the media was already fueled by hypes in the 19th century. In this address, Hyrtl actually replied to the “neuro revolution” already proclaimed in his time which prophesied the replacement of law and social order by means of new scientific findings. As long as the prevalent economy of attention defines the rules of science communication, particularly based on sensation, I consider it as legitimate to engage in critique rather in a loud than quiet manner. I cannot understand why one should refrain from the publication of names for reasons of politeness or political correctness – the idea of science implies transparency, public access and the idea that all scientists are able to justify their work when challenged. Eventually, they benefit from the high regard of scientific evidence.

For this reason I welcome the initiative of Critical Neuroscience founded by, among others, Jan Slaby from the University of Marburg and Suparna Choudhury from the Max Planck Institute for the History of Science in Berlin offering a forum for different perspectives on neuroscience. Whether under this label or when called “neuroethics” or “theory of science”, I'd rather point out problematic developments in neuroscience such as the strong focus on neurogenetics in psychiatry or its dubious application in penal law than passively receiving the neurohype; and I am looking forward to some rough arguments on these issues, at least within the blogosphere.

Source:Hyrtl, J. (1864/1897). Die Materialistische Weltanschauung unserer Zeit. Wien: Braumüller.
More: Schleim, S. (2009). Der Mensch und die soziale Hirnforschung. Philosophische Zwischenbilanz einer spannungsreichen Beziehung. In: Schleim, S., Spranger, T. M. & Walter, H., Von der Neuroethik zum Neurorecht?, S. 37-66. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht.

I'm indebted to Hugo’s in Marburg. After about six unsuccessful attempts in other cafés in the Oberstadt I eventually found internet access and later even a power outlet there. Without them, it could have been the case that this post wouldn't exist. By the way, this was my first post written next to the Lahn, a beautiful river in Germany.