The Cultural Evolution of Religion by Ara Norenzayan and Will M Gervais
Some readers of this blog may have met the post about Ara Norenzayan and his outstanding work on evolutionary studies of religion. Now, Ara has joined with another (evoluttionary) social psychologist - Will M. Gervais - for a fascinating article:
Ara Norenzayan & Will M. Gervais (University of British Columbia): The Cultural Evolution of Religion (2011)
The paper is Open Access-available and absolutely worth a read!
Here are some take-home points:
* After almost a century of dwelling in two “non-overlapping magisteria,” as Steven Jay Gould once put it, religion and science are coming together again. Long the exclusive province of the humanities and left outside of the mainstream of psychology and the behavioural sciences, religion is gaining scientific attention at a rapid pace.
* There is growing agreement that the suite of psychological tendencies that support and give rise to religious beliefs, have been shaped by the evolutionary forces that have constrained ordinary human social life throughout history.
* Once these beliefs were cognitively in place, their content was subjected to cultural selection, giving rise to belief in morally concerned policing agents who use these supernatural powers to observe, punish, and reward human social interactions. Hard-to-fake religious behavior, such as fasts, food taboos, and costly ritual performance, in turn reliably signaled the presence of devotion and therefore cooperative intention towards ingroup members, buffering religious groups from freeloaders and reinforcing cooperative norms. Religious prosociality, thus softened the genetic constraints inherent in kinship-based and (direct or indirect) reciprocity-based altruism which severely limit group size. In this way, religious prosociality facilitated the rise of stable, large, cooperative moral communities of genetically unrelated individuals.
* Once these beliefs were cognitively in place, their content was subjected to cultural selection, giving rise to belief in morally concerned policing agents who use these supernatural powers to observe, punish, and reward human social interactions. Hard-to-fake religious behavior, such as fasts, food taboos, and costly ritual performance, in turn reliably signaled the presence of devotion and therefore cooperative intention towards ingroup members, buffering religious groups from freeloaders and reinforcing cooperative norms. Religious prosociality, thus softened the genetic constraints inherent in kinship-based and (direct or indirect) reciprocity-based altruism which severely limit group size. In this way, religious prosociality facilitated the rise of stable, large, cooperative moral communities of genetically unrelated individuals.
* We have proposed that the concept of moralizing Gods stabilized cooperation levels in large groups of anonymous individuals, where reputational and reciprocity incentives are insufficient. If so, then reminders of God may not only reduce cheating, but they may also curb selfish behavior and increase generosity towards strangers. This hypothesis was tested and confirmed in two anonymous Dictator Game experiments, one with a sample of university students, and another with non-student adults.
* Indeed, in the context of recent conflicts in the world that involve Americans, it is surprising that atheists were liked less than Muslims. However, in the context of religious prosociality, the logic underlying anti-atheist prejudice becomes clear.
* Cultural evolution, driven by between-group competition for resources and habitats, has favored large groups. However large groups, which until recently lacked social monitoring mechanisms, are vulnerable to collapse due to high rates of freeloading. If unwavering and pervasive belief in moralizing Gods buffered against such freeloading, then belief in such Gods should be more likely in larger human groups where the threat of freeloading is most acute. In a cross cultural analysis of 186 societies using the Standard Cross Cultural Sample, group size was indeed a strong predictor of belief in moralizing Gods. The larger the group size, the more likely the group culturally sanctioned omniscient, all-powerful, morally concerned deities who directly observe, reward, and punish social behavior.
* Worldwide sociological evidence shows that societies, as they experience economic growth and greater conditions of existential security, move towards more secularization; yet, because religiosity has a net positive effect on fertility rates, even after controlling for socioeconomic status, secular societies are shrinking, while religious ones are expanding. As a result, a larger proportion of the world’s population remains religious, and the world has more religious people than ever before.
Printview
This is a very interesting paper Michael and I would like to thank you for bringing it to our attention. It is very relevant to my personal area of interest and, in particular, to my Genetic Priming hypothesis.
I am sure I will have more to say about it when I have had a chance to study its theories and associated empirical findings in greater detail.
I am glad that you liked it! This is as encouraging as the many hits this blog post seems to earn, as I pondered to bring this blog more into bringing news and good articles from colleagues to the interested public.
The authors say; " One argument is that atheists – hundreds of millions of people – are deluded about their own beliefs, and that “explicit atheism” masks a universal “implicit theism”"
Would you really agree with this Michael? As you probably know, I would argue that we are all genetically primed for religiosity to some extent but that there are other factors involved in producing our individual resultant religiosity. In some of us, these other factors have resulted in the negative effects being stronger than the positive ones.
They say; " It is unclear how a genetic adaptationist explanation for belief explains why anyone, let alone hundreds of millions of people, does not
believe in gods."
I haven't come across a genetic adaptationist explanation that claims that this is the only factor involved in religiosity. The additional involvement of cultural factors is surely a "no-brainer".
They say; "However, given that we know next to nothing about the psychological antecedents of atheism, we do not yet understand what aspects of one’s social environment, if any, or socialization period, predict the likelihood of nonbelief in adulthood."
If this is indeed the case, it is a gap that needs to be filled. Do you know of any work in this area Michael?
No, although I do agree with most of what the authors have written, this does not relate to every aspect. For example, I did a German paper about the factors "triggering" religiosity recently:
http://www.blume-religionswissenschaft.de/...e.pdf
As a very sound international work available in English, I would recommend "Sacred & Secular" by Inglehart & Norris (2004).
Of course, there remains much work to be done - which is the normal course of all evolutionary (and thus empirical) studies.
While I appreciate the tone of this study vs. Boyer, Bering and others, it is a bit repetitious. The authors are far too enamored with the ‘costly signaling’ and continue to miss the more significant contributions of religion to human society, most significantly, I believe, structure and leadership.
The authors mention the positive effects of ‘priming’ (reminders, reinforcements of expected norms) yet miss the obvious features of religion, priests with distinctive dress and prominent temples and statuary that have long been mainstays of settled communities which provide continual reminders to the people of their religions’ expectations.
A third missed feature that I think more significant than ‘costly signaling’ is getting the attention of the people. A costly signal would simply be ignored or scorned (as is common with atheists today) if the narrative of its context has not caught the attention of and been remembered and recognized by the observers. If the narrative and rituals are not compelling, are not readily to the mind of the observers, the primes and signals will not be noticed. Will be naught but noise on the landscape.
A good start, but only a start.
Your first paragraph relates to the issue 'What has religion given society?'.
Your second and third paragraph relate to the issue 'How do the artifacts of religion help to underline the expectations, authority and teachings of the church and carry these messages in a memorable way?'
The authors are not claiming to address either of these issues so cannot be blamed for not addressing particular aspects of these questions.
That we are not assessing blame is agreed, but the purpose of this chapter is to evaluate community and religion from an evolutionary perspective. Evolution is very much about success and achieving competitive advantage. In the words of the authors:
‘. . .competition for resources and habitats, has favored large groups.’, ‘. . .religious prosociality facilitated the rise of stable, large, cooperative moral communities of genetically unrelated individuals.’ ‘In this chapter we explain the relation between religion and prosocial behaviours within an evolutionary perspective.’ Additionally: ‘. . .to explain two fundamental, interrelated aspects of human social life: (1) the key role of religion in the rise of large, cooperative societies in the last fifteen millennia, and (2) the cultural spread and persistence of religious beliefs on a worldwide scale.’
From the authors stated goals, every feature of religion that facilitates prosociality is germane along with features that explain the spread and persistence of religion. My observation is that this chapter is focused on what I see is a tertiary, at best, facilitator towards the stated goals. Meryl Strep donning Prada sends a ‘costly signal’ as does every display of opulence or power. Such displays facilitate envy, greed, lust or desire, not cooperation. Costly signals are common through the animal communities (peacock’s tail, etc.) as well as human (Rolex, etc.). I believe the features of religion which most advance the competitive position of community to be significantly different from those which this chapter devotes its attention.
You write: ’ Additionally: ‘. . .to explain two fundamental, interrelated aspects of human social life: (1) the key role of religion in the rise of large, cooperative societies in the last fifteen millennia, and (2) the cultural spread and persistence of religious beliefs on a worldwide scale.’
Sometimes the dot, dot, dot ie ... in such quotes are of fundamental importance to the issue at hand. They are indeed in this case. The leading phrase that you have missed out is:
" These two developments can now be fruitfully synthesized to explain --- "
And the two developments to which they refer were stated by the authors earlier as:-
1. The evolutionary origins of religion
and
2. The evolutionary explanation of human prosociality.
That explains why the authors didn't bring in your other points. They did what they said they would do and no more.
Also, the 'costly signals' that they refer to are meant to convey dedication to a common belief system/ code of conduct. The examples you have given (Meryl Streep and peacocks) are meant to convey status or fitness and are irrelevant to the case being made by the authors.
Clarification of my last post ----------
The quote at the beginning is, of course, your own quotation from the paper we are discussing.
Best wishes,
John
I felt my edits would not modify the authors intent as this entire discourse, yours, mine and the authors, revolves around the evolutionary origins of religion and the evolutionary explanation of human prosociality.
Your comment on costly signals was precisely my observation as well, which made me realize that the authors’ explanation was inadequate. Costly signals has become quite the poster child of evolutionary mechanisms of late, and I think it misunderstood in its significance for religion. Costly signaling has a long evolutionary history of conveying ‘fitness’ (status, I contend, is a cultural extension of fitness), and that, I suggest, is precisely how religion is using it as well.
Human sociality also has a long evolutionary history, but its reach is severely limited, the authors suggest, by ‘trust’ which comes from familiarity in a traditional community. They cite a ‘neocortex’ analysis which predicts an upper limit of 150 individuals. Jarred Diamond, in ‘Guns Germs and Steel’ (and other publications) suggests a practical limit based on empirical observations of traditional communities of about 250 individuals.
This number, about 250 individuals, corresponds to the maximum size of a traditional human ‘tribe’, and per my research, corresponds to the largest stable of human communities in the absence of organized religion. The authors of this chapter suggest that priests/religious leaders use costly signaling to establish trust beyond this cognitive limit. While they are able to establish correlation to this hypothesis, I believe they are missing the chain of causation.
Priests established themselves as civic leaders under divine authority at the dawn of civilization, and since that time have insisted, based on that authority, on ‘civil’ behavior.
Costly signaling, in this context, is used in the strictly evolutionary fashion of reinforcing ‘fitness’, or more pointedly, the legitimacy of the priestly leadership, and in turn, respect for the civil behavior they are requesting.
I think we can all agree that civil behavior is a requirement for a functional community, and we also recognize that what we accept as ‘good’ (or even ‘good enough’) has changed over time. Culture (society) and religion have evolved remarkably over the last 15,000 years. Much of that social evolution has been to transfer more and more responsibility from religion (what I think was the foundational civic institution) to specialized institutions (tax collectors, schools and libraries, etc.), but the larger evidence of civil life suggests that religion continues to play a significant role, including with trust and civil behavior.
The chain of causation, I believe, continues to be through legitimate leadership to achieve trust with costly signaling as one aspect of reinforcing the legitimacy of priestly leadership.
"I felt my edits would not modify the authors intent ---"
Unless there is good reason to believe otherwise, authors' intent should always be taken to be just what they say it is.
Putting that to one side, you raise other aspects of 'costly signalling' in connection with the legitimacy of the priestly leadership. You mention "distinctive dress and prominent temples and statuary".
I suggest that these were not necessarily personally costly to the priests themselves. These items were certainly there to impress and engender awe/fear/ respect among their flock but the funds were usually forthcoming from those in political power and the aggregate of the many small contributions from members of that flock.
You are correct to suggest that these artifacts are relevant to the production of the pro-sociality effect of religion and I'm confident that the authors would agree. However, you are wrong to suggest that "Costly signaling, in this context, is used in the strictly evolutionary fashion of reinforcing ‘fitness’ --- "
In Darwinian Natural Selection, 'costly signalling' always refers to individual organisms signalling their Darwinian fitness. They are advertising their potential fecundity/ commitment. The authors are considering the role of 'costly signalling' in the context of cultural evolution and arguing, correctly in my view, that the observation of religious constraints on behaviour can be used to signal commitment to the beliefs of the group and that this is relevant to prosociality; particularly to that of large groups.
Very close, are we, to violent agreement. As neither of us are suggesting otherwise, we hold the authors intent to be just as they stated in the edited quote. I suggest only a slight modification to the ‘chain of causation’: That costly signaling, in every case identified by myself or the authors, reflects back to the fitness of the signaler, and adds status to that individual. In the case of religion, the ‘fitness’ of the priests/leaders reinforces the religious narrative (which they represent) and by extension, motivate the lay population to follow the plan. We are proposing no variation in the observed effect (pro-social behavior). I am just suggesting that religion has not invented some new evolutionary shortcut. ‘Darwinian fitness’ includes social dominance and leadership.
To expand on your comment about ‘who pays’ (opulent priestly robes vs. self sacrifice), I suggest that they are the same signals but tailored to different audiences. Some priests have adopted one technique, some another. It is like nature testing different mutations, developing for different niches. I think religions having different denominations and different sects shows the same thing, tailoring for different personalities or education/economic levels.
You write "I am just suggesting that religion has not invented some new evolutionary shortcut."
If you refer to 'natural' as distinct from 'cultural' evolution you are, of course, correct. With regard to cultural evolution, the authors suggest that religion has indeed invented 'hard to fake', difficult rules to demonstrate piety. These are designed to weed out any free-loaders seeking the benefits of belonging without true belief/ commitment.
These operate at group level within cultural evolution; the implication being that those religious groups that have not introduced such rules have been undermined by freeloaders and consequently have ceased to exist.
We agree on our understanding of the authors intent, but you highlight another disagreement I have. I think you correctly identify the unstated consequence being: ‘ceased to exist’, but disagree with the authors use of ‘excluding freeloaders’ – I think it misleading and that there was a more subtle discrimination sought, namely staying relevant. Priestly robes and other opulent displays were effective so long as everyone out of power (those not priests or nobles) were poor. With the rise of empires came the rise of a merchant class who could dress themselves in displays of opulence (ie. Prada). This began a ‘robes race’ that the priests could not win. Opulence was no longer a sign of power. The nobles had their swords, but the priests needed something new to set themselves apart. They invented piety and a set of ‘costly signals’ to align themselves with divine power, wealth having lost much of its power to being wider spread.
Again as culture evolves it the age of science, religion faces the challenge of becoming irrelevant to growing numbers of the well educated and well to do. A new reformation is due.
Sorry – I think I am wandering off a bit on ‘What I think they missed’. I agree that culture has incorporated costly signaling to distinguish in vs. out group membership, and that religion has established itself (in most communities for most of the time) as part of the ‘in’ group, which is just what most of the chapter covers. My rambling has to do with how I think the pro-socialization message has been reinforced: Primarily on the authority of the priests.
To throw in another curve, I will suggest an answer to the authors question: ‘[Have] secular societies . . . passed a threshold, no longer needing religion to sustain large scale prosociality.’
I will argue that the industrial revolution has provided that last necessary step, establishing a nearly all inclusive social hierarchy of authority with non-violent succession. Everyone now has an identifiable boss and a written code of conduct. That may not maintain the population, but it looks to me to maintain the domestic harmony.